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SEXUAL DESIRE: A MORAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE 
EROTIC. By Roger Scruton.1 New York, N.Y.: The Free 
Press. 1986. Pp. x, 428. $25.00. 
MORALITY, SEX, AND THE CONSTITUTION: A 
CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE ON THE POWER OF 
GOVERNMENT TO REGULATE PRIVATE SEXUAL 
CONDUCT BETWEEN CONSENTING ADULTS. By G. 
Sidney Buchanan.2 Lanham, Md.: University Press of 
America. 1985. Pp. xiii, 227. Cloth, $23.75; paper, $11.50. 
ARE GAY RIGHTS RIGHT? By Roger J. Magnuson.3 
Minneapolis, Mn.: Straightgate Press. 1985. Pp. ix, 137. 
David A.J. Richards4 
Traditional concepts of gender and sexuality are now very 
much in controversy in advanced Western societies on grounds of 
justice that, for Americans, intersect with constitutional values of 
liberty and equality. The constitutional right to privacy, for exam-
ple, has been elaborated by the Supreme Court to immunize contra-
ception and abortion from criminal penalties that reflected 
traditional conceptions of the proper role of sexuality in general and 
women's sexuality in particular. More recently, a sharply divided 
Supreme Court declined to extend the constitutional right to pri-
vacy to consensual homosexual relations, expressly legitimating the 
traditional moral attitude. Elsewhere, on grounds of equal protec-
tion, the Court has aggressively scrutinized and struck down gender 
classifications that reflect traditional notions about women's role, 
but the federal judiciary has extended no comparable scrutiny to 
classifications on the basis of sexual preferences that reflect tradi-
tional views of homosexuality. 
The three books reviewed here endeavor to defend traditional 
sexual morality. They offer a spectrum of conservative stances: 
Roger Scruton's measured and highly tentative skepticism; G. Sid-
ney Buchanan's centrist moderation; and Roger J. Magnuson's at-
tack on the idea that homosexuals have any distinctive rights, let 
alone constitutional rights. 
I. Reader in Philosophy, Birkbeck College, London. 
2. Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center. 
3. Member, Minnesota bar. 
4. Professor of Law, New York University. 
5. See, e.g., Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d 1388 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
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Both Buchanan and Magnuson write from the perspectives of 
Christian sexual morality, and at crucial points they appeal to Bibli-
cal texts and associated interpretive traditions. In consequence, 
their arguments have less value to constitutional lawyers than argu-
ments that rely on more broadly accepted traditions.6 Indeed, con-
stitutional guarantees of toleration require, I believe, that 
governmental coercion be justified by reference to something 
broader than Christianity, or it will fail constitutional tests of sec-
tarian neutrality. 1 Since Buchanan and Magnuson are so naively 
unmindful of these constitutional principles, their arguments are, 
constitutionally speaking, barely literate. 
In contrast, Scruton's argument is studiously secular and thus 
is of correspondingly greater interest for purposes of American con-
stitutional law, although his thesis is not about law as such, and as 
an English philosopher he has no apparent interest in American 
constitutional law. Accordingly, I will examine Scruton's argu-
ments at greater length than the others. 
I 
Scruton begins Sexual Desire ominously by stating his objective 
as follows: 
Whether or not the reader comes to agree with my particular conclusions, he will, I 
hope, agree that it need not be absurd to condemn homosexual intercourse, fornica-
tion, masturbation, or whatever, even though we all have an urge to do these things, 
and even though there may be no God who forbids them. 
Scruton eventually addresses these issues some 300 pages later, but 
his discussion is tentative, inconclusive, and only loosely connected 
to his philosophy of erotic experience, which occupies most of the 
book. The result is the unhappy marriage of a rather aesthetically 
florid phenomenology of eroticism and Thatcherism. They are, as I 
hope to show, strange bedfellows indeed. 
Scruton's main aim is abstractly philosophical, namely, the 
philosophical understanding of erotic experience, and the defense of 
a certain view of it against a range of both ancient and contempo-
rary accounts that, in his view, distort its nature and role. He em-
phasizes the distinctively imaginative aspect of human, in contrast 
to animal, sexuality, and characterizes that aspect as an interper-
sonal intentionality directed at experience of one another's embodi-
ment. The account is not novel, having been suggested earlier by 
6. See, e.g., Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. REV. 352 
(1985). 
7. See generally D. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986). 
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Thomas Nagel,s and Scruton adds little more than a rather mystify-
ing way of putting the point of reciprocal interest in one another's 
bodies.9 Scruton conceives his account as an alternative both to the 
Augustinian essentialist view of sexuality as procreationalJo and to 
the modern reductions of sexuality to physical orgasm that Scruton 
associates with Freud, Kinsey, Masters and Johnson, and others. 
In contrast to such views, Scruton affirms eroticism as a kind of 
imaginatively elaborated communication of sexual interests in one 
another's bodies. 
It is odd to suppose that the integrity of sexual experience re-
quires the interpersonal intentionality that Nagel and Scruton em-
phasize. Their view has the unacceptable consequence, for example, 
that any sexual experience in which one of the parties lacks full 
reciprocal intentionality must be a kind of perversion; this view 
seems to condemn not only prostitution but every lover who takes 
too little interest in his partner's pleasure.'' Scruton stretches the 
concept of perversion to encompass anything that he regards as 
outside the perimeter of morally defensible sex-masturbation, for 
example. He thus fails, like many other conservative sexual moral-
ists, to capture the nature and varieties of good sex and begs the 
question of the morality of variant sexual styles.12 
Scruton parodies Freud, Kinsey, and Masters and Johnson be-
cause he objects to the emancipatory criticisms of conventional sex-
ual morality that their work unleashed, which he interprets as a 
kind of depersonalization of sexual experience. The point of their 
work, however, is exactly the converse: conventional sexual moral-
ity unreasonably constrains sexual experience within a narrow 
range (for example, Augustinian procreational sexuality) and thus 
stultifies the larger role of sexuality as an independently important 
experience that becomes the humane bond of intrinsically valuable 
companionate relationships. 13 
8. See Nagel, Sexual Perversion, MORTAL QUESTIONS 39-52 (1972). 
9. "In the full ardour of desire, each participant is striving to be present in his body, 
and striving also to view his own striving from a point of view outside it," R. ScRUTON, 
SEXUAL DESIRE 127. See also id. 289-90. 
10. For pertinent discussion of Augustine's views and arguments, see D. RICHARDS, 
SEX, DRUGS, DEATH AND THE LAW: AN EssAY ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND 0VERCRIMINAL-
IZATION 37-38 (1982). 
II. I take this criticism from Levy, Perversion and the Unnatural as Moral Categories, 
90 ETHICS 191 (1980). 
12. For elaboration of this point, see D. RICHARDS, supra note 10, at 97-112. 
13. See, e.g., W. MASTERS & V. JOHNSON, THE PLEASURE BoND (1975). For explora-
tion of emancipatory implications of their arguments, see D. RICHARDS, supra note 10, at 29-
153. 
The distinction between animal and human sexuality was a central postulate of Freud's 
emphasis on the distinctive role of sexuality in human personality: 
466 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 4:463 
The abstract account of erotic experience that Scruton offers is, 
if anything, more spiritually akin to this modernist understanding 
of sexuality than it is to the traditional Augustinian view. But 
Scruton interprets his account in a way that ties it closely to con-
ventional sexual practices and attitudes. There is, he argues, no es-
sentialistic truth of the person and therefore no essentialist truth 
about erotic experience, but only conventional stylizations of that 
experience. Scruton endorses the conventional stylization that we 
associate with heterosexual marital monogamy, and he connects it 
to a larger structure of historically legitimate institutions. His con-
servatism is like that of the high Tory tradition of Burke and 
Oakeshott, which (as he puts it) founds its "picture of political or-
der and legitimate government upon a perception of the nature of 
domestic relations and the erotic bond which underlies them." 
But no political tradition is as simplistically homogeneous as 
Scruton supposes. For example, the British tradition includes, 
among its glories, the liberalism of John Stuart Mill's The Subjec-
tion of Women and On Liberty, both of which support positions that 
Scruton eschews. How are we to adjudicate while caught between 
Scruton's and Mill's explication of the British tradition? And how 
are we to adjudicate among competing interpretations of the Ameri-
can tradition, which includes the most radical guarantees of separa-
tion of secular and religious authority yet devised by the mind of 
man?I 4 Presumably, we must offer arguments about which tradi-
tions are better or worse, more just or less unjust, and more hu-
manely civilized or less barbarously cruel and prejudiced. 
It is, after all, a distinctive feature of Western religion, ethics, 
and law that the sense of enduring values is open to new empirical 
and normative perspectives that often revise old assumptions (for 
example, the inferiority of women or homosexuals) in the interest of 
a deeper elaboration of more abstract values of equality and liberty. 
Scruton dismisses the kind of historical sensitivity that Foucault 
brought to the study of Western sexual morality, but whatever the 
The sexual instinct ... is probably more strongly developed in man than in most of 
the higher animals; it is certainly more constant, since it has almost entirely over-
come the periodicity to which it is tied in animals. It places extraordinarily large 
amounts of force at the disposal of civilized activity, and it does this in virtue of its 
especially marked characteristic of being able to displace its aim without materially 
diminishing in intensity. This capacity to exchange its originally sexual aim for 
another one, which is no longer sexual but which is psychically related to the first 
aim, is called the capacity for sublimation. 
S. FREUD, 'Civilized' Sexual Morality and Modern Nervous Illness, in 9 COMPLETE PsYCHo-
LOGICAL WORKS OF SIGMUND FREUD 181, 187 (standard ed. 1959-1975). For a comparison 
of the animal and human data, see C. FORD & F. BEACH, PATTERNS OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR 
199-267 (1951). 
14. See generally D. RICHARDS, supra note 7. 
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merits of Foucault's account,ts it still raises the kind of historical 
questions that any serious religious, ethical, or legal analysis should 
bring to these issues. 
Except to those who are already in his camp, Scruton's argu-
ments are singularly unconvincing. Consider, for example, his piv-
otal discussion of sex and gender. Scruton attacks "Kantian 
feminism," the view that "what I really and fundamentally am, for 
myself and another, is a person." He rejects this view because he 
believes that erotic experience belies it: the experience of sex is not 
an experience of persons simpliciter, but of persons across "a great 
ontological divide" of gender. Much of our moral and political ex-
perience today does not see women in this way, however, and re-
gards the "ontological" weight that Scruton would give gender as a 
kind of injustice akin to the now discredited use of stigmatizing ra-
cial classifications to set off racial minorities as a distinct moral spe-
cies.t6 Heterosexuals and homosexuals are attracted to women or 
men, as the case may be, but today the attraction is not polarized 
around traditional gender stereotypes.t7 Thus, even from the per-
spective of the phenomenology of eroticism, Scruton's description 
of sexual experience along rigid gender-defined lines is, as he ac-
knowledges, a highly personal profession of faith in traditional 
heterosexuality. 
Scruton denigrates homosexual erotic love on the ground that 
one's own gender is unmysteriously "experienced as through and 
through familiar to you," and thus incapable of the full consumma-
tions of erotic experience that only ignite across the "great ontologi-
cal divide" of gender. What does this mean? That erotic fires blaze 
only if partners have different sex organs? This sounds like the bio-
logical reductionism Scruton deplores elsewhere, and as such it con-
veys a false picture of human sexual experience, doing violence to 
the subtle variations of temperament and personality and character 
that are the differentiating loci of erotic attraction and love, both 
heterosexual and homosexual.ts At precisely the point where we 
15. See I M. FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION, (R. Hur-
ley trans. 1978); 2 THE USE OF PLEASURE: THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, (R. Hurley trans. 
1985); 3 THE CARE OF THE SELF: THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY, (R. Hurley trans. 1986). 
16. The most brilliant exposition of this argument remains Mill's. See THE SuBJEC-
TION OF WoMEN (1869). For a striking judicial exposition of this argument, see Justice 
Brennan's opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
17. See, e.g., B. EHRENREICH, E. HESS & G. JACOBS, REMAKING LOVE: THE FEMINI-
ZATION OF SEX (1986); H. GOLDBERG, THE HAZARDS OF BEING MALE (1976); J. PLECK & 
J. SAWYER, MEN AND MASCULINITY (1974). 
18. On the continuities in homosexual and heterosexual sexual experience and bonding, 
seeP. BLUMSTEIN & P. SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES (1983); W. MASTERS & V. JOHN-
SON, HOMOSEXUALITY IN PERSPECTIVE (1979). 
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need an argument as to why one tradition of sexual experience is to 
be preferred over another, instead we get an intuitive appeal to a 
now embattled conception of sexual experience, which masquerades 
as the measure of all eroticism. 
Scruton glorifies "[t]he nuptiality of desire," including a rich 
repertoire of marital sexual techniques (for example, fellatio and 
cunnilingus), and he justifies much sexual morality as a protection 
against jealousy, "the greatest of psychical catastrophes." But 
surely these interests cannot be narrowly limited to heterosexual re-
lationships in the way that Scruton assumes. Doesn't the failure of 
law to accord similar marital protections to homosexuals represent 
a refusal to respect their interests in "the nuptiality of desire"? 
Although Scruton's criticisms of homosexuality are considera-
bly more tentative than one might expect, he does regard it as 
intrinsically imperfect. This is because homosexuality denies Scru-
ton's phenomenological premise "that gender distinctions play a 
constitutive role in the sexual act." But Scruton's account is, even 
on its own terms, strained and unconvincing. The general form of 
Scruton's philosophy of the erotic (namely, a reciprocal intentional-
ity of mutual embodiment) is, as Nagel's more persuasive account 
shows,I9 quite consistent with homosexual love, for such love may 
as fully express erotic reciprocal intentionality as the most fiery het-
erosexual lovemaking. Ultimately, Scruton offers little more than 
conservative dogmatism. 
II 
G. Sidney Buchanan's Morality, Sex, and the Constitution is an 
avowedly Christian perspective on the power of government to reg-
ulate sexual morality. Buchanan's conception of enforceable sexual 
morality rests on two alternative grounds: (1) the right of demo-
cratic majorities to impose their moral views, or (2) the enforcement 
of sectarian religious views. But neither Buchanan's majoritarian-
ism nor his sectarianism is a legitimate principle of constitutional 
law in the way he supposes. 
The scope of the majority rule principle in American constitu-
tionalism is circumscribed by procedural and substantive limits that 
are designed, in the terms of Madison's classic argument, to curb 
the powers of "factions." As defined by Madison, a faction is 
"a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minor-
ity of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common 
impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citi-
19. See Nagel, supra note 8, at 50-51. 
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zens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the commu-
nity. "2o We think today of racism and sexism as exemplifying such 
factionalized prejudices; and we regard the equal protection clause 
as a prohibition on the enforcement of moral views that express 
them. But as Madison clearly saw, religious sectarianism also ex-
emplifies the evils of faction. The religion clauses of the first 
amendment-which Madison authored-are substantive con-
straints on the expression of sectarian religious views through law .21 
Therefore, it does not suffice to cite the principle of majority rule as 
the ground for enforcing moral views through law, for such 
majoritarian moral views may flout essential constitutional princi-
ples and not provide a proper basis for law. 
Unfortunately, the only account Buchanan offers of enforcea-
ble public morality, beyond the majority rule principle, is an appeal 
to sectarian morality. This becomes quite clear in his defense of the 
constitutionality of the continuing prohibition of same-sex mar-
riages. Although Buchanan defends the expansion of the constitu-
tional right to privacy to homosexual acts, he draws the line at 
homosexual marriage, which he regards as too great an attack on a 
majoritarian moral value. But Buchanan explains the moral value 
in question in terms of a religiously sacramental conception of mar-
riage, which he freely concedes does not have a secular rational ba-
sis. If Buchanan cannot offer a secular argument for denying a 
public good like marriage to homosexuals, he is using the law to 
deny fair respect to the rights and interests of a minority group for 
the sake of the heterosexual majority that is crudely insensitive to 
its claims. I believe it is precisely this factionalized oppression that 
flouts core principles of American public law. 
Roger J. Magnuson's Are Gay Rights Right? is, unlike 
Buchanan's moderate and centrist argument, an attack by a reli-
gious fundamentalist on the very idea of gay rights. Magnuson not 
only simplifies the theological debates over the alleged biblical con-
demnations of homosexuality,22 but naively supposes these debates 
to be dispositive on issues of constitutional justice in the United 
States. That would be enough to remove this book from serious 
consideration as a constitutional argument. But the constitutional 
flaw of the book cuts much deeper. For Magnuson, homosexuality 
is a kind of heretical attack on fundamental values, and he wants to 
eradicate this subversive menace. This is the sort of crusade that 
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 at 78 (J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961). 
21. For more extensive analysis, see D. RICHARDS, supra note 7, at 67-162. 
22. See J. BosWELL, CHRISTIANITY, SociAL TOLERANCE AND HOMOSEXUALITY 
(1980). 
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the Bill of Rights should prevent: "[h]eresy trials are foreign to our 
Constitution, "23 and there is nothing more erosive of the spiritual 
fabric of American public law than to exile any group from the ba-
sic rights of all Americans on the ground that their beliefs, or 
speech, or way of life is a heresy to the true American tradition. We 
need to be more, not less, sensitive to the constitutional claims of 
homosexuals today precisely because they are unjustly targeted as 
vulnerable political exiles from the constitutional community of 
equal rights under law.24 
SUING THE PRESS. By Rodney A. Smolla.1 New York, 
N.Y.: Oxford University Press. 1986. Pp. 277. $19.95. 
Mark Silverstein 2 
Rarely is a Supreme Court decision greeted as enthusiastically 
as was New York Times v. Sullivan. For years, Supreme Court dicta 
had placed libel and slander outside the protection of the first 
amendment, leaving the print and broadcast media subject to poten-
tially huge libel judgments under the vagaries of state libel laws. 
Concluding that a rule of law that required newspapers to guarantee 
the truth of all assertions inhibited public debate, the Court in New 
York Times held that the first amendment bars public officials from 
recovering damages for defamatory statements without proof that 
the challenged statements were made with knowledge of their falsity 
or with reckless disregard for whether they were true or false. In 
repudiating the old doctrine of seditious libel and proclaiming the 
free and unfettered exchange of ideas to be the hallmark of a society 
dedicated to self-government, the Court won overwhelming ap-
proval for a decision considered by knowledgeable observers to be 
an important step toward the ideal of an open and democratic soci-
ety. Moreover, the decision appeared to herald the emergence of 
the media, the federal courts and the black civil rights movement as 
a powerful coalition destined to change the very nature of American 
politics. Hence the decision in New York Times not only national-
ized the libel laws of the fifty states in the name of more effective 
self-government, but it also symbolized the dynamic political and 
social changes of the 1960s. Small wonder that as astute a critic as 
23. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944) (Douglas, J., writing for the Court). 
24. I develop this argument at greater length in Richards, Constitutional Legitimacy 
and Constitutional Privacy, N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
I. Associate Professor of Law, University of Arkansas. 
2. Assistant Professor of Political Science, Boston University. 
